4 conclude, we illustrate the limitations of the study and outline the contributions the paper makes.
Nonprofit Advocacy Activities
We understand advocacy as the "expressive function" (James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986, p. 9) or the voice of nonprofits. By this we mean their ability to gain access to the relevant institutions or individuals and the capability to influence them (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014) . Hence advocacy can be seen as "the term generally used to describe efforts to influence public policy" (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998, p. 488 ) and thus to effect changes in the nonprofits' operating environment (Frumkin, 2002; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; Suarez & Hwang, 2008) . Similar to other contexts, public policy in the Russian Federation is understood as the principles, policies, and practices implement by state power (Wheeler, Unbegaun, Falla, & Thompson, 2000) . Advocacy therefore turns nonprofits into active governance actors (Chaskin & Greenberg, 2013) ; non-elected representatives for their constituency or the public (Mosley & Grogan, 2013) . Consequently, the objectives of nonprofit advocacy activities are wide ranging and can include agenda setting, influencing long-term priorities and/or resource allocation (Andrews & Edwards, 2004) . In addition, Mosley (2012) observes that nonprofits engage in advocacy activities when policy restricts their ability to deliver services, use advocacy to build partnerships with the state and its agents, to secure funding, and/or share/promote their expertise. A vital part of nonprofit advocacy activities also relates to lobbying, the attempt to directly influence legislation or legislative developments (Suarez & Hwang, 2008) . Both advocacy as well as its subset of lobbying activities are shaped by the regulatory context faced by nonprofits (Kerlin & Reid, 2010) .
In this paper we focus on service-providing nonprofits for whom advocacy is often a secondary activity (Van Til, 2009 ). These organizations, due to the nature of their funding 5 arrangements, are often in a good position to access policy makers (Mosley, 2010; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) . For many such nonprofits advocacy is a crucial support activity (Van Til, 2009 ). Even though service-providing nonprofits will have fewer organizational capabilities than their advocacy specialist counterparts (Andrews & Edwards, 2004) , their engagement in advocacy is often crucial to achieve both their long-term objectives (Suarez & Hwang, 2008) and to create spaces for social engagement.
Service-providing nonprofits chose to engage in advocacy for either social benefit, e.g. often associated with lobbying in the public interest, or organizational benefits, e.g. advocacy for organizational maintenance and/or survival (Duer & Mateo, 2013; Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014; Mosley, 2012; Suarez & Hwang, 2008) . Nicholson-Crotty (2009) finds that advocacy can often lead to costly retribution against nonprofits by hostile ruling and governing elites, including the withholding of resources. In turn this means that service-providing nonprofits have to carefully balance their social justice and public interest goals with their serviceproviding activities (Sanders & McClellan, 2014; Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2009 ). We now turn to look in more detail at potential advocacy tactics used by service-providing nonprofits. Mosley (2011) states that nonprofits can engage in advocacy that is indirect and/or insider focused. Indirect tactics are used when nonprofits advocate without directly participating in the policy making process. Hence, indirect tactics are targeted at engaging the public and influencing the public discourse. Indirect advocacy activities may include "writing letters to the editor, working with advocacy coalitions, issuing policy reports, and conducting a demonstration" (Mosley 2011, p.441) or utilizing social media outlets (Guo & Saxton, 2014) . The mobilization of the public is key to indirect tactics and thus such tactics are more 6 conducive to advocate for issues which have a wider social benefit (i.e. benefit the broader public (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014) ).
Nonprofit Advocacy Tactics
Conversely, where nonprofits use their personal connection to influence public policy, Mosley (2011) describes this as insider advocacy or tactics. Insider tactics rely on the nonprofit's capability to directly interact with ruling and governing elites. This interaction can take place in a formal, institutionalized setting such as public hearings or committees or informally through personal meetings (Mosley, 2011) . To operationalize insider tactics nonprofits not only require direct access to state institutions but also to individuals embedded within ruling and governing elites. These sort of advocacy activities are more conducive to ensuring organizational maintenance (Duer & Mateo, 2013; Mosley, 2012) .
In a democratic context, nonprofits seek a balanced combination of both indirect and insider tactics to advance their advocacy objectives. In this way they are able to engage with multiple governance levels (Beyers & Kerremans 2012) and raise both public awareness (indirect tactics) and increase direct participation (insider tactics) (Mosley, 2012) . Lobbying activities, for example, require this sort of balance of tactics (Suarez & Hwang, 2008) .
Further, in strengthening their advocacy work nonprofits often use political ties (Beyers & Kerremans, 2012) , establish advocacy networks (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006) join specialized umbrella organizations (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010; Kraemer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013) , or bolster membership (Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008) .
However, these insights into nonprofit advocacy behavior assume that such organizations operate in an environment within which a political culture of public participation and pluralism exists. This is not the case in the context of the Russian Federation (Titterton, 2006 ). Yet, understanding nonprofit advocacy in such a context is important for a number of reasons. First, nonprofit advocacy reflects their capability to influence public policy and monitor government behavior (Andrews & Edwards, 2004) . Second, advocacy reflects the institutionalization of public participation in the political process (Meyer, 2004) .
Third, advocacy ensures nonprofit survival by facilitating access to resources (Mosley, 2012) .
Nevertheless, little is known about the availability, motivation and use of advocacy tactics in managed democracies and thus warrants further attention. . The Russian context therefore provides an interesting venue within which to explore advocacy tactics. To provide some context we shortly summarize the literature of Russian civil society development. In so doing we draw on Salamon and Anheier's (1998) suggestion of considering a variety of contextual influences that shape the social space available for nonprofit activity and action.
A Constricted Social Space: The Advocacy Potential of Russian Nonprofits
The space in which Russian nonprofits operate is still informed by its Soviet antecedents. During the Soviet Union there was no independent 'third sector' as open dissent and public protest was prohibited. Instead Russian society split into two halves, ordinary citizens in one, using ties of friendship and family to hedge against the vagaries of central planning, whilst elites -factory controllers, senior apparatchiks and party members used similar ties to gain favors, obviate rules and consolidate their position and occupied the other half (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000) . Thus strong ties existed within these groups but there was no third sector to bridge the space between the two. This fostered mistrust particularly from citizens towards elites. The result was a constriction of Soviet social space.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union this constricted spaced remained intact.
Elites operationalized their ties to secure control of the newly privatized sector, whilst ordinary citizens used their ties to hedge against the uncertainties of shock therapy, privatization and mass state withdrawal from social services (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000) . At the same time organizations like the ones making up the environmental movement which had been so instrumental in taking advantage of the political opportunity of perestroika 8 for mass protest (Tarrow, 1988; Weiner, 2002) , splintered into a myriad of small and single issue organizations competing for resources (Crotty, 2006) , no longer capable of engaging the public in this way.
In addition, factors emerging from within the new Russian state further impeded nonprofit development. First the public rejected volunteering in formalized settings as a reaction to forced participation in public life during the Soviet period which meant that nonprofits have difficulties in recruiting volunteers (Howard, 2002) ; second as a result of Russia's constricted social space legacy nonprofits are parochial and inward looking resulting in a lack of public participation and support for organizations (Crotty, 2006; Spencer, 2011) .
Third nonprofits were unsuccessful in developing domestic funding channels relying on foreign support directed at activities without public support (Henderson, 2002) . Finally, the persistent importance of informal relationships in the Russian Federation (Ledeneva, 2006 ).
As stated above, the nature of central planning necessitated the forming of strong informal relationships, either to access resources or to retain your elite position. Informal relations thus constituted a vital aspect of everyday life in the Soviet Union (Mishler & Rose, 1997) and remain an integral part of political and business life in the Russian Federation (Ledeneva, 2006) . However, nonprofits are often characterized as being outside these networks with organizations missing informal relations and their associated links (Ljubownikow, Crotty, & Rodgers, 2013) , as well as opposition and hostility towards nonprofits has impeded the development of insider advocacy. In addition, legislative changes since 2006 have limited political opportunity (Ljubownikow & Crotty, 2014; Tarrow, 1988) to engage or bridge the gap between the public and the Russian elite.
The Putin/Medvedev administrations have implemented stricter regulation affecting nonprofits, which include rules on the use of funding (Maxwell, 2006) , classifying nonprofits assessed as politically active (for example those engaging in advocacy activities) and 9 receiving foreign funding as foreign agents (Bennetts, 2012) . In addition, large fines for unofficial demonstrations have also been introduced (Bryanski, 2012) . Alongside these developments, the Russian state has also promoted regional Civic Chambers (Obshchestvennaya palata) as the main channel for nonprofit-state interaction (Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010).
Civic Chambers are government initiated structures meant to encourage scrutiny of public policy making and public administration (Richter, 2009) . They are also responsible for the allocation of government funding to nonprofits. Further, the Civic Chambers also organize regular roundtables and committees for invited nonprofits to raise and discuss their issues (Richter, 2009 ). However, the invited nature of the Civic Chamber (most members are appointed by ruling and governing elites (Richter, 2009) ) and its monopoly on access to state authorities have a potential restricting effect on the advocacy activities of nonprofits. Thus legislative, cultural-historic and organizational factors shape a constricted social space for nonprofit advocacy activity. Tarrow (1988) asserts that for political opportunity to occur, nonprofits or social movements need one or a combination of shifting alignments, or division within elite groupings and influential allies, particularly in non-democratic settings, that can protect them from elite response. Within Russia's constricted social space, even if political opportunities arose nonprofits appear to be both without allies and the state has already signaled the nature of its response to nonprofits seeking to take advantage of any such opportunity -ultimately limiting political opportunities therein.
Despite these negative indicators, there are some recent examples where nonprofits have engaged in effective advocacy. This includes criticism of regulatory changes impacting nonprofits (Alekseeva et al., 2005) leading to legislative amendments. Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova (2010) also highlight a positive advocacy experience of nonprofits coming together at a regional level forcing the re-routing of a planned oil pipeline around 10 Lake Baikal. Nonprofits have also been successful in case advocacy and supported individuals in bringing litigation charges against businesses and local councils through the Russian court system (Fröhlich, 2012) . However, these examples contrast strongly with the wider literature on Russian nonprofits which overwhelmingly indicates that such organizations have limited advocacy potential (Crotty & Hall, 2013) .
Thus drawing on the wider and general literature on Russian nonprofits we would expect that Russian nonprofits are likely to have underdeveloped or constrained advocacy opportunities. To explore this, we focus on Russian nonprofit engagement in activities of an advocatory nature (including lobbying) and how nonprofits understand and utilize these activities. Before presenting our findings we first provide an overview of our research study.
The Research Study
To date, most of the understanding of nonprofits in the Russian context has been informed by the study of such organizations in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 2010) . With the experience of organizations in provincial Russia differing, we base our study in the Russian cities of Perm, Yekaterinburg, and Samara. These three cities are representative of Russian cities located in industrialized-provinces, which have a significant defense sector and are over 80% ethnic Russian (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010) . We choose these three urban areas as study sites for HEnonprofit advocacy, because they are the location of the respective regional authorities and in provincial Russia it is urban areas where Russia's middle class resides and which is traditional associated with more nonprofit activity (Salamon & Anheier, 1998) . Thus these cities provide the study with a relevant as well as sufficiently similar context to examine HEnonprofit advocacy and minimizing potential regional factors to act as explanatory influences (Miles & Huberman, 1999 ) enhancing transferability of our insights (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) .
HEnonprofits were purposefully selected (Siggelkow, 2007) based on their activities and objectives to fit with the study's focus on health and education. Further we also drew on organizations' own categorization as to whether they defined themselves as nonprofits in the Russian Federation often known as obshchestvennyi organizatsii, which translates into social or public organizations. Data was collected via a semi-structured interview protocol. This protocol was informed by the advocacy literature and literature on Russian civil society development (a selection of the questions asked were what projects/activities organization do, what factors impact their work, whether they engage in advocacy, what they consider advocacy to be, and which of their activities they associated with advocacy) and allowing respondents to provide a narrative of their organizations modus operandi (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) . Such an approach enables us to capture the respondent's own interpretations (Eisenhardt, 1989) assisting us in evaluating how respondents understand and characterize the activities of their organization. Reflecting Spencer's observation (2011, p. 1080) of Russian nonprofits, most HEnonprofits in this study were also dominated by 'democratic centralism', where the leader's ideas are automatically adopted by full member consent. Thus, the leader's response represents the most relevant opinion to organizational decision-making. Therefore, interviews were conducted in Russian with leaders of nonprofits lasting on average 45 minutes. To reduce the risk of self-reporting bias in the interview, this data was triangulated during the coding and analysis process with observational and artefactual data (such as flyers, pamphlets, published material, and other publically available information) collected by attending HEnonprofit events. Appendix A provides an overview of the organizations in this study, their activities, and a proxy measure for size.
To protect the confidentiality of respondents, their responses and organizations were anonymized using acronyms. For analysis all interviews were transcribed and translated into English in situ, calling on the skills of native speakers wherever discrepancies arose. Documents and artefactual data, if the latter contained textual content, were also translated into English. Akin to open coding, inductive coding started with reading and rereading interview transcripts, documents, and other textual data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) . This process led to the emergence of codes, which were then grouped, into emerging themes. This thematic coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006) led to themes centered on the activities of nonprofits, whether respondents defined these as entailing advocacy, and how organizations understood and organized any advocacy activities they saw themselves engaging in. Themes were then assessed for common patterns and/or differences and Mosley's (2011) definition of indirect and insider advocacy was used to organize data points.
To ensure coding reliability and reduce ambiguities the codes and themes were discussed with field experts during and after the coding process. All interview data was crosschecked against observational notes and data artefacts which also assisted to establish relationships between different parts of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1999) . In this process we also compared whether the narratives and discourses by respondents differed based on geographical location. Although there were some differences (for example in Perm respondents made more references to incidents of indirect advocacy tactics however often describing the activities of other none human service organizations rather than their own), our aim was to establish an overarching narrative illustrating the challenges and issues Russian HEnonprofits faced in a constricted societal space rather than capturing organizational or regional variances. We present our analysis by drawing on the practices of reporting narrative enquiry outcomes where the aim is to highlight how respondents make sense of their own world (Bruner, 1991) . Thus we present the narrative constituting the emergent themes using 'illuminating examples ' (de Vaus, 2001, p. 240 ) from the interviews to exemplify key points.
Findings Indirect Tactics
Mosley (2011) suggests a variety of activities that can be characterized as indirect advocacy tactics. However, the activities Mosley (2011) describes require the mobilization of the public -a capability Russian nonprofits lack . Despite this, HEnonprofits in this study did illustrate that they " [wrote] letters to the social protection department" (Respondent 50, Org02Yek) or are "writing a complaint" (Respondent 38, Org13Per) on behalf of their constituents. HEnonprofits also illustrated that they wrote letters for specific individuals who would approach them directly for assistance. This was not done as part of a planned advocacy campaign but instead part of the organizations case advocacy approach. If these letters were ineffective however, HEnonprofits appeared to capitulate stating that they "never go to court" (Respondent 48, Org23Per) or followed up failed complaints. Other indirect advocacy tactics were absent from the respondents' narratives or their use was rejected. Respondent 32, captures the attitude towards demonstrations present in all the narratives captured by this study.
The authorities turn away from them [organizations which engage in demonstrations]
and mainly cooperate with us. Events such as going on to the street and shouting give us this, give us that, we do not do this. We do not want conflict with the authorities or the government (Respondent 32, Org08Per).
Similarly, respondents stated that "I do not like working through demonstrations at all" (Respondent 48, Org23Per), or did "not do big actions and activities like that
[demonstrations]" (Respondent 52, Org04Yek). Hence, in addition to the historic lack of organizational capability to mobilize the public and the public's apathy to engage with nonprofits (Crotty, 2006) , HEnonprofits viewed demonstrations or direct protest action 14 negatively. HEnonprofits perception of elite response (Tarrow, 1988) meant that participation in such events was viewed as resulting in antagonizing a state that had already constrained nonprofits' social space. Thus HEnonprofits actively rejected the participation therein.
Furthermore, demonstrations and other indirect advocacy tactics required organizations to collaborate with others in for example advocacy coalitions or umbrella organizations (Balassiano & Chandler, 2010) . Although HEnonprofits did note that they cooperated on for example "organizing a roundtable" (Respondent 47, Org22Per) this interaction was described as "helping us mainly morally" (Respondent 6, Org06Sam) or downplayed as unimportant "[it is] not really cooperation, it is more an exchange of ideas" (Respondent 50, Org02Yek). When the narrative on co-operation was explored further, HEnonprofits indicated that that "there is no love or friendship lost" (Respondent 27, Org03Per) between organizations. They also and portrayed other HEnonprofits as "competitors" (Respondent 6, Org06Sam; Respondent, 27, Org03Per; Respondent 49, Org01Yek) rather than partners for a common cause or a member of the same social movement. In pitting one group against another the foreign funding regimes of the 1990s (Henderson, 2002) have contributed to this resistance to collaborate. With competition now for state funding still in place, this is unlikely to change.
The experience of Russian HEnonprofits suggests that they perceived the majority of indirect advocacy tactics available to nonprofits (see Mosley, 2011) as not relevant. The politicization of nonprofit advocacy activity by the state via regulation and targeted organizational inspections (Earle, 2013) , has dis-incentivized HEnonprofits from using indirect advocacy tactics. Thus HEnonprofits also saw no need to involve or mobilize the public. This combined with the absence of advocacy coalitions deprived HEnonprofits of leverage vis-à-vis ruling and governing elites. It seems that the constricted social space in which HEnonprofits exists limits the use of indirect advocacy tactics and requires them to utilize insider advocacy tactics.
Insider Advocacy
As illustrated above, insider tactics were not associated with specific activities, but were instead delineated by the ability of nonprofits to directly access ruling and governing elites (Mosley, 2011) . For example, Mosley (2012) considers access based on personal relationships as providing a crucial platform for insider advocacy. HEnonprofits in this study illustrated several direct access opportunities to ruling and governing elites. HEnonprofits sought to "participate in all meetings, committees, roundtables, conferences that are organized by the government" (Respondent 29, Org05Per). Reflecting the importance of personal ties (Mishler & Rose, 1997) , respondents also highlighted that they could use connections such as "university friends or friends I made around that time" (Respondent 79, Org30Yek) to gain access to these meetings. However, most pointed out that to participate in these meetings you needed to be "invited" (Respondent 61, Org12Yek). In addition, engagement in such events was often a one-off and did not allow HEnonprofits to develop an outlet for more systematic insider advocacy tactics. Thus HEnonprofits were aware of the need to "move away from onetime events" (Respondent 64, Org15Yek) as part of developing regular access to ruling and governing elites. As a result a number of HEnonprofits (Org01Sam, Org07Sam, Org18Sam, Org02Per, Org05Per, Org11Per, Org12Per, Org02Yek, Org12, Yek, Org15Yek, Org30Yek), indicated that they had tried to get elected to the regional Civic Chamber. A place in the Civic Chamber would provide consistent access to the regional ruling and governing elites.
HEnonprofits were aware that they participate in "manipulated structures" (Respondent 61, Org12Yek) , and that these are not "initiatives [that] come from the ground up" (Respondent 33, Org09Per). Nevertheless, this access enabled HEnonprofits to become "friendly with the government and lets them know we exist" (Respondent 64, Org15Yek).
Thus insider advocacy was seen less as a way of influencing decision making by ruling and governing elites but an opportunity to promote "ideas" (Respondent 16, Org17Sam) , "where you should speak your mind" (Respondent 64, Org15Yek) or "approach the authorities with a problem" (Respondent 48, Org23Per). However, HEnonprofits were also aware of elite response (Tarrow, 1989) and that the scope of topics that could be discussed within the Civic Chamber was limited because "you will not be re-invited if you raise something they do not like" (Respondent 50, Org02Yek).
Thus, HEnonprofits in this study did not engage roundtables and committees for insider tactics. Instead they were seen as "a good way for the government to tell us about (Mosley, 2011 (Mosley, , 2012 HEnonprofits in this study did not portray such emerged relationships in this way. Instead these relationships were more useful for day-to-day activities as they facilitated "solving problems that we face when we want to do an event" (Respondent 79, Org30Yek). Thus, as respondent 60 outlines, HEnonprofits were motivated to engage in these roundtables or committees so that they "will be able to tell the relevant person without the Civic Chamber" (Respondent 60, Org11Yek), rather than using the direct access offered by the state as part of their advocacy tactics.
Using Advocacy Tactics: Case Advocacy
As illustrated above for HEnonprofits in this study, advocacy was also not about influencing policy but a way of accessing information for dissemination amongst their constituencies (clients as well as members) or providing a service. In so doing, advocacy was viewed as "enlighten[ing] people about their rights" (Respondent 54, Org06Yek).
Thus understanding of advocacy was markedly different from how advocacy is defined in the literature or understood in mature democracies (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998) where such activities are aimed at promoting a common or aggregate interest (Andrews & Edwards, 2004) or organizational maintenance (Mosley, 2012) . Moreover in our study, The fact that advocacy was focused on the individual rather than shaping public discourse is no doubt an outcome of the constricted nature of HEnonprofits operating environment. It might also suggest that HEnonprofits lack the necessary organizational capacity to engage in influencing at the policy level. However, HEnonprofits in this study stated that advocacy at the policy level at the municipal or regional level bore little fruit because "it is very difficult to change the situation for the better on a regional level (…), because decision are made in Moscow" (Respondent 42, Org17Per). In addition, Respondent 12 described the sentiments of others in highlighting that governing elites at the municipal and regional level lacked the willingness to engage with nonprofits and thus enable their participation in policy making. This perceived lock out at the regional and municipal level explains why HEnonprofits in this study focused on advocacy for individuals to assert their social rights. In turn this meant that HEnonprofits only engage in advocacy type activities that would not get them into trouble with ruling and governing elites, and thus limited harmful elite response (Tarrow, 1988) . Consequently, advocacy activities for individuals had become part of the services provision HEnonprofits offer to their constituencies. The lack of narrative with regards to participation in more systematic ways to influence policy is however, worrisome as it means that interest representation within Russia's ailing welfare sector remains underdeveloped (Cerami, 2009 ). This service based approach to advocacy allows low level individual grievances to be smoothed out, without presenting a challenge to the overall authority of ruling and governing elites. It also means that current nonprofit advocacy has limited scope to drive democratization.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine how Russian nonprofits advocate. In so doing we answer Almog-Bar and Schmid's (2014) call to add nuance to the understanding of advocacy in different contexts. Little has been known about the availability, motivation and use of advocacy tactics in managed democracies and our paper sheds some light on these issues. Russia's managed democratic context and cultural-historic heritage provide an insight into nonprofit advocacy tactics.
In this paper we employed Mosley's (2011) framework of indirect and insider advocacy tactics to structure respondents' narrative on the nature and use advocacy activities.
Our evidence indicates that this framework is simplistic in describing the complicated contextual factors affecting Russian nonprofits' choice of advocacy activity. Thus the respondents' discourse shows an awareness of a wide variety of indirect advocacy activities available. Although Mosley's (2011) framework is useful in providing an initial description of indirect advocacy, it does not account for the constrictedness of the context in which Russian HEnonprofits operate and the limited choice of actual advocacy activities available. These choices are limited because HEnonprofits fear antagonizing the state and a negative elite response or retaliation (Tarrow, 1988) . Retaliation could be proactive such as unannounced organizational audits (Earle, 2013) , blacklisting which restricts an nonprofit's ability to access funding from domestic sources, or passive with ruling and governing elites ignoring organizations and subsequent loss of access. Hence, Russia's managed democracy demonstrates that in a socially constricted context nonprofits face a more complex and nuanced consideration when making choices about advocacy and attempting to balance service-provision objectives and social justice goals (Sanders & McClellan, 2014; Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2009) . Therefore, in extending Mosley's (2011) framework to the Russian case where societal space for nonprofits is constricted, we need to establish the subcategory of limited indirect advocacy tactics.
Another key aspect of Mosley's (2011) This has resulted in a pragmatic response by Russian HEnonprofits, who see institutionalized access points not primarily as opportunities to influence but opportunity to build or maintain personal relationships to facilitate organizational maintenance or case/client advocacy. In the Russian setting with constricted societal space for nonprofit activity, we have to refer to institutionalized insider advocacy tactics, thus adding a subcategory to Mosley's (2012) insider tactics. Such institutionalized insider advocacy tactics also mean that 20 organizations are reluctant to cooperate with each other as access is limited and thus competitive. Our evidence suggest that organizations perceive that those nonprofits winning such access take a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to ruling and governing elites which limits engagement in indirect advocacy activities. Mosley (2011) states that nonprofits engage in advocacy via both indirect and insider tactics and although this suggest that organizations might need to consider trade-off engaging in one and not the other, the assumption of this consideration is based on the potential effectiveness of the various tactics. This also assumes that consistent opportunity for advocacy exists and that organizations have the skills to engage in advocacy and advocacy choices are about tactical effectiveness. However the context of the Russian Federation highlights that organizational consideration about trade-offs focused less on tactical effectiveness and more on organizational survival. Although limited indirect advocacy tactics encouraged HEnonprofits to involve the wider Russian public and give vulnerable sections of society a voice, institutionalized advocacy tactics facilitate organizational survival and their ability to provide services to these groups. Our insights show that HEnonprofits felt that it was better to have some interaction with the state and its institutions even if it is controlled, licensed, and directed by ruling and governing elites, rather than no involvement at all. They trade off indirect advocacy tactics. Interaction means that the state was aware of HEnonprofits existence. This constitutes a positive development because in the past ruling and governing elites were altogether ignorant to the existence of nonprofits (Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010) . In the longer run, human service nonprofits may be able to leverage this attention by influencing public policy and government behavior (Andrews & Edwards, 2004 ) and contribute to the democratization process or widen public participation in political processes (Meyer, 2004) .
The conclusions drawn here do need to be seen in light of the limitations of this study.
A larger sample, different methodological approach, different sectors and regions may have 21 led to different reactions and narratives and are avenues for future research. Despite these limitations and the papers focus on only two specific types of organizations in three Russian regions, our findings show a strong relationship with the extended literature on civil society in Russia Jakobson & Sanovich, 2010; Spencer, 2011) .
Our results also suggest that the recently observed success of advocacy activities (Fröhlich, 2012; Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 2010 ) remain singular events and are not yet evidence of the development of an active advocacy culture among all types of Russian nonprofits. The narratives of respondents indicate that HEnonprofits both fear elite response as well as lack the relevant capacity or organizational culture, i.e., their understanding of advocacy as only a case based activity, to take full advantage of available, albeit institutionalized, advocacy opportunities. Hence nonprofit advocacy activities in this context remain constrained (Crotty & Hall, 2013 
